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THE FUTURE OF STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS IN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Poonam Puri*
I. INTRODUCTION

The emphasis of corporate governance evolves as economic,
political and social environments change.' Since the most recent
economic crisis and current downturn, corporate governance has
focused on issues such as risk management by boards, executive
compensation, shadow banking, credit rating agencies and the
appropriate2 role of direct government ownership in private
enterprises.
An effective corporate governance regime involves a spectrum of
mechanisms that range from mandatory legal rules to purely
voluntary initiatives. Legal mechanisms include the board of3
directors, the fiduciary duty that directors owe to the corporation,

and specific legal obligations that directors have to particular
stakeholders. 4 They also include shareholder rights to elect the board,
*

1.

2.

3.
4.

Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School (<ppuri@osgoode.yorku.ca>), Co-Director, Hennick Centre for Business and Law, and Director of
Research and Policy, Capital Markets Institute. Thanks to Sylvia Schumacher,
Anne Ramsay, Rebecca Procter and Vanisha Sukdeo for excellent research
assistance. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (ssHRc) for research on
voluntary environmental initiatives.
See generally John Ruggie, "Reconstituting the Global Public Domain - Issues,
Actors and Practices" (2004), 10 E.J.I.R. 499, online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 571825 >; Cristie L. Ford, "New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation" (2008), 45 Am.
Bus. L.J. 1.
See generally Brian R. Cheffins, "Did Corporate Governance 'Fail' During the
2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the s&P 500", online: SSRN < http://
papers.ssrn.com>; Simon C.Y. Wong, "Uses and Limits of Conventional
Corporate Governance Instruments: Analysis and Guidance for Reform
(Integrated Version)", online: ssaN <http://papers.ssrn.com>; Klaus J. Hopt,
"Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European
Corporate Governance After Enron", online: ssp.N <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 571825 >.
Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 (CBCA), s. 122(l)(a).
CBCA, ibid., s. 119.
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appoint the auditors and receive information, and shareholder and
stakeholder remedies such as the oppression remedy and the
derivative claim. 5 Securities laws provide additional administrative,
quasi-criminal and civil remedies that impose a further governance
discipline on public companies. At the other end of the spectrum,
market mechanisms include incentives to maintain a good
reputation, and shareholder activism by institutional investors such
as public pension funds.6 The value and usefulness of the various legal
tools are vigorously debated amongst academics and policymakers,
as is the ability of market actors to self-regulate. 7 The separation
between state regulation and market forces is not absolute; rather, the
relevant issue is where on the continuum between state regulation and
market forces our overall system of corporate governance should lie.
An important organ of corporate governance is the board of
directors of a public company. 8 Under Canadian corporate law,
directors have a duty to act honestly and in good faith with a view to
the best interests of the corporation; this is often known as the
fiduciary duty or the duty of loyalty. 9 Corporate law statutes provide
no guidance on the interpretation of this principle. Thus corporate
directors and officers are afforded a high degree of discretion in
corporate decision-making. Should the phrase, "the best interests of
the corporation" be interpreted as what is best for the shareholders of
a corporation? This would be consistent with shareholder primacy
models since shareholders are considered the residual owners of the
corporation after specific legal obligations to other stakeholders have
been discharged.' Or should "the best interests of the corporation"
involve directors considering the interests of stakeholders even
beyond specific legal obligations that are owed to them when making
significant corporate decisions? This approach would be more
aligned with stakeholder theory.
In the recent case BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders" (BcE), the
Supreme Court of Canada (scc) attempted to provide guidance on
5.
6.

7.

CBCA, ibid., ss. 241 and 239.
Poonam Puri, "Pension Funds: Their Role in Capital Markets, Corporate
Governance and a Competitive Economy", Report to the Expert Commission on
Pensions (2008), online: Expert Commission on Pensions < http://www.pensionreview.on.ca/english/summaries/14Puri.html >.
Alan Greenspan, "The Evolution of Banking in a Market Economy" (remarks at
the Annual Conference of the Association of Private Enterprise Education,
Arlington, April 12, 1997), online: Federal Reserve <http://www.federalreserve.gov>.

8.
9.
10.

CBCA, supra, footnote 3, s. 158.
CBCA, ibid., s. 122(1).
CBCA, ibid., s. 119.
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this issue. However, the decision did not provide sufficient clarity as
to whether the scc supports shareholder primacy or stakeholder
theory as the conceptual basis for interpreting "the best interests of
the corporation". The decision also does not provide for sufficient
practical guidance for directors and officers in the boardroom.
I argue in this article that greater consideration of stakeholder
interests in business decision-making is dependent on a range of
factors beyond legal rules, and in particular, beyond directors'
fiduciary duties. In my view, corporate culture matters. Who the
corporate directors and corporate managers are, and their principles,
their vision and motivations for their actions are important. Context
also matters. The composition of the shareholder base and support or
resistance from other stakeholders impacts corporate decisionmaking, as do pressures facing the industry. 12 1 am not suggesting
that there is no role for law; quite the contrary, the law provides a
general framework but has its limitations. As such, the potential of
non-legal mechanisms that can advance stakeholder interests are
discussed in this article, with particular reference to two issues:
environmental and social issues, and racial and gender diversity
issues. By exploring these issues, I argue that businesses regularly
engage in initiatives that advance stakeholder interests (and allow
them to be socially responsible and good corporate citizens) and that
their behaviour can be explained by a complex combination of
directors' and management's vision of the right thing to do, their view
on long-term value maximization, pressure from shareholders,
stakeholders and non-governmental organizations (NGOS), as well
as a desire to avoid governmental regulation or mandatory legal
rules.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief overview of
the BCE transaction and Supreme Court of Canada decision as it
relates to the fiduciary duty and the business judgment rule. Part III
explores voluntary initiatives undertaken by corporations with a
focus on environmental and social issues, and diversity issues. Part IV
concludes.
11.
12.

[2008] S.C.J. No. 37 (QL), [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560.
See generally Roger L. Martin, "The Virtue Matrix: Calculating the Return on
Corporate Responsibility" (2002), 80 Harv. Bus. Rev. 68, who writes that it is
important to note that legal structures impose certain priorities on senior
executives. The perception of failing to maximize shareholder value in favour of
corporate social responsibility (csR) activities may cost a manager or executive his
or her job. This may explain the reluctance of CSR from emerging in new areas senior executives may not want to take the lead and face the corresponding risk.
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II. THE BCE DECISION

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in BCE was disappointing
because the scc did not seize the opportunity to provide useful
guidance to the Canadian legal and business community on how to
appropriately balance risks and rewards amongst shareholders and
different groups of stakeholders in difficult corporate decisions.
Instead, the scc makes general statements on the fiduciary duty that
ring hollow without context; the scc also articulates the business
judgment rule in such a way that corporate directors and officers are
effectively insulated from review by the courts, leaving stakeholders
with little or no legal recourse or accountability.
BCE involved the largest proposed leveraged buy-out and
privatization in Canadian history. In March 2007, BCE confirmed
that the company was considering privatization, and was in the
process of "[r]eviewing its strategic alternatives and would be guided
by the goal of maximizing shareholder value". 13 BCE'S Board
presented the bidders with rules for the 14bidding process, indicating
a very clear focus on shareholder value.
The $51.7 billion deal with Teachers' Private Capital & Providence
Equity Partners (Teachers) (the Transaction) involved selling BCE for
a 40% premium over the then-trading price of BCE shares. Bell
Canada, a subsidiary of BCE, would guarantee $30 billion of debt to be
taken on by BCE to finance the buy-out by Teachers. The deal was
unanimously approved by BCE'S Board and approved by over 97% of
the shareholders of BCE.

However, the guarantee provided by Bell on debt to be issued to
BCE fundamentally changed the risk profile of the existing bonds
issued by Bell Canada. The market reacted by reducing the trading
value of Bell Canada's bonds by as much as 20%, based on the
increased risk of default. 15 The subsequent downgrading of the bond
ratings underscored the increased investment risk: a non-investment
grade status could force some institutional investors to sell because
they are required to comply with specified investment restrictions,
13.

BCE, "Notice of Special Shareholder Meeting and Management Proxy Circular",
August 14, 2007, online: SEDAR <http://sedar.com> at p. 14 (Proxy Circular).

14.

Proxy Circular, ibid., at p. 17. The bidding rules required the private equity

bidders to make submissions with respect to the details on the proposed purchase
price and form of consideration per share for the common shares of BCE, and the
proposed treatment of each series of preferred shares of BCE and of the debt
securities issued by BCE and its subsidiaries, as well as a detailed mark-up of any

15.

proposed changes to the definitive transaction agreement circulated by BCE.
Carrie Tait, "Rebels stuck with BCE'S hefty legal bills", Financial Post (June 23,
2008), online: Financial Post <http://www.financialpost.com>.
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possibly putting even further downward pressure on the bonds'
trading value.
The Board's focus in negotiating and approving this deal was

entirely consistent with shareholder value maximization. The Board
looked through the corporation and focused on shareholders over
other stakeholders. In its proxy circular, BCE explicitly stated that the
Board would not "have fulfilled its duties had it negotiated a
transaction that provided less value to Common Shareholders in
order to provide debentureholders with additional protections that

they did not bargain for or obtain under the terms of the Indentures",
with the cost6 of such protections implicitly being borne by
shareholders.'
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the proposed transaction

to proceed as structured. 17 Analyzing the Supreme Court's language

makes it clear that in terms of fiduciary duty post-BCE, a version of
shareholder primacy remains1 8 although consideration should be
given to the interests of other stakeholders. Equally clear from the

Supreme Court's decision is the broad articulation of the business
judgment rule and the breadth of the deference granted to directors in
balancing the interests of stakeholders, subject only to certain basic

constraints.
While consideration of stakeholder interests is permitted or

possibly required, 19 the Supreme Court refused to offer guidance
on the priority among stakeholders when interests conflict and
directors need to allocate risks and rewards amongst different groups

of stakeholders. In this regard, the Supreme Court simply stated that
Proxy Circular, supra, footnote 13, at p. 23.
BCE, supra, footnote 11, at para. 167.
Ibid., at paras. 167 and 66. A version of shareholder primacy remains in that
sense that the scc allowed the BCE transaction to go ahead, thereby prioritizing
shareholder interests over other stakeholder interests, but held that other
stakeholder interests should also be considered, where specific facts warrant.
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Macintosh, "BCE and the Peoples Corporate Law: Learning to
Live on Quicksand" (2009), 48 C.B.L.J. 255. (The court's decision seems unclear
on this point: BCE, supra, footnote 11, at para. 40, the court says that "directors
may look to the interests of. . . shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers,
governments and the environment to inform their decisions" (emphasis added).
However, at para. 66 the court seems to suggest that in certain circumstances
directors "must consider" stakeholder interests: "Directors, acting in the best
interests of the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their
decisions on corporate stakeholders" (emphasis added), and at para. 82: "the
duty of the directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a
duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate actions equitably and
fairly". A full discussion of whether directors "must" or "may" consider
stakeholder interests is outside the scope of this article; however, it is important
to note that this debate exists.)

16.
17.
18.
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the fiduciary duty of directors to the corporation is a broad,
contextual concept. 20 The content of this duty varies with the
situation at hand.2 ' "Often the interests of shareholders and
stakeholders are co-extensive with the interests of the corporation.
But if they conflict, the directors' duty is clear - it is to the
corporation. 22 The court's comments here are not very helpful; they
provide little guidance to directors as to how they should prioritize
interests, and offer very little comfort to any stakeholder group about
how much they can reasonably expect from boards, beyond what may
be contractually agreed to or specifically provided for in legislation.
In other passages, the court seemed to endorse a stakeholder
conception of the corporation by making important aspirational
comments and used language such as "good corporate citizen" 23 and
"responsible corporate citizen" 24 The court engaged in an analysis of
reasonable expectations of stakeholders, referring to them as "the
cornerstone of the oppression remedy". 25 It went further to recognize
that stakeholders and corporations engage in relationships based on
expectations and understandings, and that stakeholders are entitled
to rely on these expectations, provided they are reasonable in
context. 26 However, where reasonable expectations of stakeholders
compete with the best interests of the corporation, the duty is owed to
the corporation. 27 The difficulty comes in reconciling the reasonable
expectations of stakeholders with the best interests of the
corporation.
Given the Supreme Court's lack of clarity2 s in respect of how
boards are to prioritize stakeholders' reasonable expectations as
against shareholders' expectations, the board benefits from a
significant increase in discretion and decrease in litigation risk. In
these instances, directors will be further insulated by judicial
deference: "Courts should give appropriate deference to the
business judgment of directors who take into account these
29
ancillary interests, as reflected by the business judgment rule."
20. BCE, supra, footnote 11, at para. 38.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., at para. 37. (For this proposition, the Supreme Court cites Peoples
Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 244 D.L.R.
(4th) 564, as authority.)
23. Ibid., at para. 66.
24. Ibid., at para. 82.
25. Ibid., at para. 61.
26. Ibid., at para. 63.
27. Ibid., at para. 66.
28. Supra, footnote 19.
29. BCE, supra, footnote 11, at para. 40. (The Supreme Court adopts the articulation
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The Supreme Court has therefore managed to avoid the major policy
decision of prioritizing a corporation's stakeholders; instead, it has
made the30 major policy decision of delegating the matter to
directors.
The BCE decision can in many ways be seen as a hollow victory for
advocates of stakeholder rights, and leaves a question unanswered: if
the decision of how to reconcile conflicting stakeholder interests is
delegated to directors, how and on what basis should they undertake
such decisions? It is credible to argue that director decision-making,
in general, will be guided by corporate norms, which historically have
favoured shareholders. But norms, culture and context change over
time, and this is where the Supreme Court's aspirational comments
about businesses being good corporate citizens and acting fairly and
responsibly to other stakeholders create an opportunity for directors
to advance stakeholder interests.
The next part of this paper explores environmental and diversity
initiatives undertaken by businesses, as examples of stakeholder
considerations which are not mandated by any specific legal
obligations or by the general fiduciary duty, but are voluntary
initiatives that have been undertaken by corporations as being
consistent with the long-term interests of the business.
III. VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES WITHIN THE PARAMETERS
OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

When organizations engage in activities or initiatives, which are
not required by specific legal obligations or by the general fiduciary
duty of directors and officers, they do so on the basis that the decision
is good for the long-term interests of the corporation. Benefits of
engaging in these initiatives typically include reduced risk, lower cost
of capital, less waste, improved employee productivity, imroved
brand equity and strengthened relationships with regulators. 31 Poor
of the business judgment rule from Pente Investment Management Ltd. v.
Schneider Corp. (1998), 113 O.A.C. 253, 42 O.R. (3d) 177 sub nom. Maple Leaf

Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp. (C.A.); and Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3
S.C.R. 331, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 601 (DanierLeather): "The 'business judgment rule'
accords deference to a business decision so long as it lies within a range of
reasonable alternatives.")

30.

See generally Lynda Oswald, "Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under the Takings Clause" (June 1998), online: ssRN
< http://ssrn.com >. (It should be noted that Canada does not have stakeholder
statutes, as do approximately 30 U.S. states. Stakeholder statutes permit
managers to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in the
corporation. This includes parties such as employees, customers, suppliers, and/

or the local community.)
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risk management systems in organizations can lead to depressed
share price, higher insurance premiums, reduced market share, and
reduced customer loyalty. 32 Other factors relevant in adopting
measures or initiatives not specifically required by law can include
appeasing shareholders, employees, NGOS and other stakeholder

groups, as well as avoiding or pre-empting governmental regulation.
Corporate accountability, especially among multinational
corporations, may be driven more by pressure from consumer and
33
financial markets, and less by government or regulatory pressure.
Some commentators dismiss voluntary initiatives as nothing more

than "P1" or "greenwashing", 34 arguing that their impact on, for
example, environmental sustainability and other social objectives is
not as great as intended; 35 however, by publicly adopting voluntary
initiatives, corporations are opening themselves up to be held

accountable for their commitments. Voluntary initiatives also
raise an important issue from a legal perspective: in light of BCE, can
stakeholders' expectations be reasonably heightened and eventually
legally protected based on initiatives that are undertaken voluntarily
by businesses?
The next two sections explore environmental and social

governance and diversity issues in the workplace as examples of
voluntary initiatives undertaken by businesses outside of specific
legal obligations and outside of the general fiduciary duty.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

Geoffrey M. Heal, "Corporate Social Responsibility - An Economic and
Financial Framework" (December 2004), online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com >.
S.G. Badrinath and P.J. Bolster, "The Role of Market Forces in EPA Enforcement
Activity" (1996), 10 J. Regul. Econ. 165; Anthony Herbst, "An Analysis of the
Stock Market's Response to the Exxon Valdez Disaster" (1996), 7 Global
Finance Journal 101 at p. 102; Gordon L. Clark and Tessa Hebb, "Why Should
They Care? The Role of Institutional Investors in the Market for Corporate
Global Responsibility" (2005), 37 Environment and Planning A 2015.
Clark and Hebb, ibid., at p. 2016.
See generally, John M. Conley and Cynthia Williams, "The Corporate Social
Responsibility Movement as an Ethnographic Problem" (October 16, 2008),
online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com>.
See generally J. Van Oosterhout and Pursey P.M.A.R. Heugens, "Much Ado
About Nothing: A Conceptual Critique of CSR", (2006) ERIM Report Series,

36.

online: <http://hdl.handle.net/1765/7894>; Neil Gunningham and D. Sinclair,
Leaders & Laggards, Next Generation Environmental Regulation (Sheffield:
Greenleaf Publishing, 2002); Rhys Jenkins, "Corporate Codes of Conduct: SelfRegulation in a Global Economy" (2001) United Nations Research Institute for
Social Development, online: UNi <http://www.unrisd.org>; Banks, Climate
and Energy, BankTrack, online: BankTrack <http://www.banktrack.org>.
"Contact Ombudsman", online: Tyco <http://www.tyco.com>. Some organizations such as Tyco have initiated a corporate ombudsman whose role it is to
respond to questions and challenges from external stakeholder groups.
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1. Environmental and Social Governance Initiatives
Numerous international initiatives exist which address corporate
social responsibility, with a particular focus on environmental and
social governance (ESG) issues. Each has its own perspective,
mandate, and guidelines for behaviour. Some are industry-specific,
some are driven by the public sector, some by the private sector;
almost all7 have mechanisms in place to ensure senior management
support.3
Based on the high level of support that many of these voluntary
initiatives enjoy, it seems the global business community accepts-at
least to some degree - the argument that good corporate citizenry
contributes to profitability. Businesses also enter into these initiatives
to avoid mandatory governmental regulation on these matters. The
UN Global Compact, the Carbon Disclosure Project, the Equator
Principles and the Principles for Responsible Investing are four of the
more prominent examples ofvoluntary initiatives. They are discussed
below.
The UN Global Compact is a policy platform and practical
framework, founded in 2001, which strives to align business strategies
and operations with a set of 10 principles specifically addressing
human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption.3 8 The
underlying rationale is that business is the primary driver of
globalization; incorporating these principles into business
strategies and operations can "help ensure that markets,
commerce, technology and finance advance in ways that benefit
economies and societies everywhere" . 9
It is voluntary and network-based, and advocates active
engagement of the corporate sector, in cooperation with organized
labour and civil society. It requires a commitment by the
corporation's CEO (or equivalent) and their highest oversight body,
typically the Board of Directors.4 0 Participating corporations are
expected to integrate the uN Global Compact and its principles into
Sheila Bonini, David Court and Alberto Marchi, "Rebuilding Corporate
Reputations" (June 2009) McKinsey Quarterly, online: McKinsey Quarterly
<http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com> (EBSCOHOST). Research by McKinsey &
Company indicates that in the current environment in which reputational issues
threaten both shareholders and a corporation's ability to achieve its goals, a
corporation's strategy for managing reputational risk must be led by the cEo,
ideally with the support of a dedicated board committee.
38. "Overview of uN Global Compact", online: ut Global Compact <http://
www.unglobalcompact.org>.
39. Ibid.
40. "Business Participation", online: uN Global Compact <http://www.unglobalcompact.org >.
37.
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their business strategy, day-to-day operations, and organizational
culture. Corporations commit to producing an annual public
document, such as a sustainability report, that describes the ways
in which the organization is implementing the 10 principles and how it
supports broader development objectives. 4 1 The uN Global Compact
over
benefits from broad acceptance, with over 7,700 particpants,
4
5,200 of which are businesses, from over 130 countries.
While the UN Global Compact is one of the more prominent publicsector initiatives; the three initiatives discussed below were each
instigated by the private sector, to encourage and facilitate private
sector support for ESG schemes.
The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 4 3 is an initiative by private
enterprise that encourages voluntary disclosure of corporate data
relevant to climate change. The underlying theory is that measuring
and disclosing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will facilitate the
reduction of GHGS by participants. 44 In 2008, 385 institutional
investors representing $55 trillion in assets under management
participated in the CDP. 4 5 The project enjoys the support of some very
high-profile organizations and individuals: Walmart has instructed
its suppliers to disclose their carbon emissions through the CDP, in 46
an
chain.
supply
extensive
its
of
emissions
GHG
the
measure
to
effort
While the CDP specifically measures GHG emissions, the Equator
Principles (EPs) are a set of principles for managing environmental
and social risks specifically in project finance. They are an investordriven, voluntary, private sector initiative, negotiated and developed
by banks, based on the standards of the World Bank and the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), with participation and
input from other stakeholders. As of January 11, 2010, 68 financial
institutions,
including all of the Canadian banks, had adopted the
4 7
EPS.

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Home Page, online: Carbon Disclosure Project <http://www.cdproject.net>.

44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. "Walmart: Reporting through cDP revealed valuable insight into its greenhouse
gas footprint" What We Do, online: Carbon Disclosure Project, supra, footnote

43; Edward J. Waitzer et al., Corporate Social Performance: Reporting Roundtable Consultation Paper, Toronto 2009 (Toronto: Hennick Centre for Business
and Law and Jantzi Sustainalytics, 2009) at 15, online: SSRN <http://
papers.ssrn.com> (Waitzer et al.).
47. "Become an Adopting Institution", online: The Equator Principles <http://
www.equator-principles.com/join.shtml >.
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To the extent that banks are significant lenders in project finance,
they must conduct due diligence, including critical environmental
and social evaluation. In this vein, the EPS are consistent with profit
maximization and rational due diligence behaviour. Boards
recognize that their reputation and profitability could suffer by not
addressing these risks when making lending decisions: Royal Bank of
Canada (RBC)signed the EPS to show its support for the need to better
assess, mitigate, document and monitor the credit risk and
reputational risk associated with financing development projects
with capital costs over US$10 million.48 In 2006, the EPS added a
requirement stating that each EP bank must publicly report on its
implementation processes and experiences. 49 Empirical studies have
shown a reflexive relationship between disclosure of non-financial
information (whether mandatory or voluntary disclosure), firm
performance on social and environmental issues, and a firm's overall
value. 50 It should also be noted that, in adopting the EPS, banks may
be opening themselves up to increased risk through lender liability
theory and doctrines, stemming from their increased role in
evaluating social and environmental issues arising in project
finance. 51
The Principles for Responsible Investing (PRI) sit between the
public sector UN Global Compact and the private sector CDP and EPS
in the sense that the PRi are an investor-driven initiative, partnering
with the ui Global Compact and UNEP FI (United Nations Equator
Principles Financial Institutions).52 The PRI represent over 670
institutions globally, representing asset owners, investment
managers, and professional service partners. They provide a
guideline for incorporating ESG considerations into investment
"Project Finance and the Equator Principles", online: Royal Bank of Canada
< http://www.rbc.com >.
49. "The Equator Principles": A financial industry benchmark for determining,
assessing and managing social & environmental risk in project financing" (July
2006), online: Equator Principles <http://www.equator-principles.com>.

48.

50.

51.

Alyson Slater and Sean Gilbert, "The Evolution of Business Reporting: Make
Room for Sustainability Disclosure" (2004) Envtl. Qlty Mngmt., online: Global

Reporting Initiative <http://www.globalreporting.org>. While this paper is not
on the Equator Principles specifically, its concepts are nonetheless applicable.
See generally Benjamin J. Richardson, "Mandating Environmental Liability
Insurance" (2002), 12 Duke Env. L. & Pol'y F. 293 (HeinOnline); Ryan Hansen,

"The Impact of the Equator Principles on Lender Liability: Risks of Responsible
Lending" (2006) London School of Economics and Political Science LL.M.
Dissertation, online: ssRN <http://papers.ssm.com>.
52. About, online: United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment <http://
www.unpri.org>.
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decision-making, while not unduly compromising performance of
investment portfolios.
Application of the PRI is intended to lead to better long-term
financial rewards, and better alignment of objectives between
institutional investors and society at large.53 The underlying theory
is that in encouraging investors to become more active owners, senior
corporate leadership will take a more active interest in extra-financial
drivers of risk and reward. This approach is anticipated
to define
54
corporate profitability over the medium to long term.
The sanctions for non-compliance with the PRI, or any other
voluntary initiative, do not rely on legal or regulatory underpinnings.
Rather, they rely on a corporation's voluntary and public acceptance
of certain principles, or a certain code of conduct; consequently, the
sanctions for non-compliance lie fundamentally in terms of
reputational risk.
A report released in 2005 by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

(Freshfields Report), 55 on behalf of the Asset Management Working
Group of UNEP Fi examined the legality of including ESG
considerations in investment decision-making practices among
institutional investors across nine countries. In Canada, the Report
focused on pension funds, life insurance companies and mutual
funds, 56 and concluded that there was no specific guidance with
respect to boards contemplating ESG considerations in their decisionmaking, either at common law, or injurisprudence. 57 They concluded
that trustees are not barred from including ESG considerations,
provided these considerations do not constrain the ultimate goal of
profit maximization. 58
A follow-up report known as Fiduciary 99aims to provide legal
guidelines for fiduciaries seeking to integrate ESG considerations into
53. Ibid.
54. Frequently asked questions, online: United Nations Principles for Responsible
Investment, <http://www.unpri.org>.
55. Paul Watchman et al., "A legal framework for the integration of environmental,
social and governance issues into institutional investment" (Geneva: Asset
Management Working Group, 2005), online: United Nations Environment
Programme Finance Initiative <http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/
freshfields.legal-resp_20051123.pdf >.

56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid., at p. 49.
Ibid., at pp. 49-52.
Ibid., at pp. 52-54.
Paul Watchman et al.,"Fiduciary Responsibility: Legal and practical aspects of
integrating environmental, social and governance issues into institutional
investment" (Geneva, Asset Management Working Group, 2009), online: United
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative <http://www.unepfi.org/
fileadmin/documents/fiduciarylI.pdf>.

2010]

Future of Stakeholder Interests

439

their investment decision-making. 60 The Report recommends that
ESG considerations should 'enhance and supplement' the investment
decision-making process, and should aid in identifying the best
investments in terms of risk/reward, as required by U.S. fiduciary
law. 6 1 The authors go so far as to suggest that institutional investment
consultants and asset managers have a professional duty of care to
proactively raise ESG considerations with their clients, and that a
failure to discharge this duty could give rise to negligence claims. 62 I
am not suggesting that Canadian fiduciaries necessarily have a duty
of care at this time to proactively raise ESG considerations with their
clients; however, it is interesting to note the direction of international
discourse on this issue.
Further to these voluntary initiatives, pressure for mandatory
disclosure on environmental, social and governance issues by
governments and regulators is mounting. The US Social
Investment Forum and the European Sustainable Investment
Forum, supported by investor coalitions, are pushing for
mandatory ESG disclosure by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in the United States and the European
Commission (EC). Under current Ontario securities regulation,
reporting issuers are required, under continuous disclosure
obligations, to disclose information about environmental matters
and risks, if that information is material.63 In December 2009, the
Ontario Securities Commission (osc) provided the Minister of
Finance with recommendations regarding these disclosure
requirements: 64 the regulator is not recommending any additional
disclosure requirements for issuers; however, they are recommending
enhanced compliance guidance and education for issuers, and a
compliance review in Spring 2010. Issuers that are not fully compliant
then may face greater compliance costs than in the past. 6 5 Essentially,
60.

Ibid., at p. 14.

61.
62.

Ibid., at p. 15.
Ibid., at p. 16.

63.

Ontario Securities Commission Staff Notice 51-716, online: Ontario Securities

64.

Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw sn_20080229_51716_enviro-rpt.jsp>; National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations (December 31, 2008), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category5/rule_20081231_51102_unoficial-consolidated.pdf>; Danier Leather, supra, footnote 29.
Waitzer et al., supra,footnote 46; Ontario Securities Commission Notice 51-717,
Report to the Minister of Finance (December 18, 2009), online: osc <http://
wwwosc.gov.on.ca > (osc Report to Minister of Finance). This report was issued
in response to a resolution passed in April 2009 calling on the province's
securities regulator to report back to the Minister of Finance with recommendations for enhanced disclosure requirements for issuers.
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the recommendations entail stepped-up policing. The push for
enhanced and/or mandatory ESG disclosure is partly a result of the
view that global investment markets did not understand or
voluntarily take into account the ESG risks that contributed to the
2008/2009 global financial crisis.
Institutional investors have also been pushing for enhanced
disclosure through shareholder resolutions. In 2009 alone, a
minimum of six EsG-related shareholder resolutions 66 resulted in
commitments from corporations to enhanced disclosure and/or
further steps to monitor or change corporate behaviour. The
supporting statement of Meritas Mutual Funds' shareholder
proposal to Toromont Industries Ltd. specifies that "[i]ncreasingly,
investors are demanding improved disclosure by companies of how
they assess, manage and mitigate the multiple risks associated with
67
climate change in order to protect long-term shareholder value."
This section highlighted a few of the ESG initiatives taking place
outside of formal mandatory legal rules; each voluntary initiative
involves corporate acceptance, behaviour modification, and
voluntary compliance. While these initiatives have been
undertaken in the absence of a fiduciary obligation imposed on
directors and officers, there is mounting pressure for governments
and regulators to develop specific mandatory disclosure rules on
ESG issues, highlighting the reflexive and complex relationship
between hard law and voluntary or market-based initiatives. The
next section explores similar themes relating to racial and gender
diversity issues.

65.

66.

osc Report to Minister of Finance, ibid., at pp. 10-12. Corporate governance

disclosure recommendations include a follow-up compliance review in Spring
2010, and continued educational outreach to issuers. Recommendations in
respect of environmental disclosure include additional guidance for issuers, and
enhanced training for osc staff.
Shareholder Association for Research & Education, Shareholder Resolution
Database, online: SHARE <http://www.share.ca> (SHARE). The proposals range
from requesting that the corporation participate in the Carbon Disclosure Project
(Toromont Industries Ltd.), monitor GHG emissions (Suncor Energy), reduce the
environmental effects of the business (Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan,
Agrium Inc.) and report on the effects of climate change on the company

67.

(Sherritt international Corporation, E-L Financial Corporation).
SHARE, ibid., online: SHARE <http://www.share.ca>. Meritas Mutual Funds'
shareholder resolution to Toromont Industries, in advance of the AGM April 23,
2009.
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2. Diversity
Diversity in this context is a term that encompasses the view that a

workforce, diverse in terms of gender, age and ethnicity, is better able
to understand the marketplace, including customers, suppliers and
investors, thereby positively impacting profitability.
Academic debate on this point has been longstanding and

robust. 68 Not surprisingly, the issue is more nuanced than a simple
yes/no answer would suggest; however, generally, the answer seems
to be yes, depending on a number of factors. 69 It has been empirically
shown that diversity on corporate boards drives corporate

performance. 70 Specifically, benefits of diversity have been
articulated as:
" increasing the board's ability to monitor managers, due to
its increased independence;

" improving board decision-making based on new perspectives,
creative approaches, and innovative, non-traditional thinking;
* improving quality of information to managers, due to

diverse knowledge held by directors;
* access to significant resources and constituencies externally;
* positive messages to labour, consumers and the financial
markets;
* legitimacy with both internal and external stakeholders.7 1
In Canada, regulatory organizations such as the

TSE 72

(as it then

was) have come out with their own reports on good governance, such
as the 1994 Dey Report, 73 the 1999 five-year review of the Dey
Report's recommendations,
68.

74

and the 2001 Saucier Report. 75 Each

For an insightful analysis of the relevant literature, see Aaron Dhir, "Towards a
Race and Gender-Conscious Conception of the Firm: Canadian Corporate
Governance, Law and Diversity" (2010), 35 Queens L.J. [forthcoming], online:
SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com>.

See generally, David A. Carter, Frank D'Souza, Betty J. Simkins, W. Gary
Simpson, "The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial
Performance" (March 2008), online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com> (Carter);
Cristian L. Dezs6 and David Gaddis Ross, "'Girl Power': Female Participation
in Top Management and Firm Performance" (August 2008), online: ssiRN
<http://papers.ssm.com>.
70. Carter, ibid., at p. 9; Dezs6 and Ross, ibid.
71. Carter, ibid., at p. 9.
72. "Benefits of Going Public and Listing With Us", online: TMX Group: <http://
www.tmx.com> The Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) has been known as the sx
since 2000. Its functions include regulatory oversight of its listing issuers.
73. Peter Dey, "'Where were the Directors?' Guidelines for Improved Governance in
Canada" (December 1994), online: European Corporate Governance Institute
< http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/dey.pdf>.
69.
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of these has encouraged diversity on76 boards specifically to bring
diverse perspectives to bear on issues.

Nonetheless, women in Canada remain severely underrepresented
on boards, relative to their numbers in society; over 40% of Financial
Post 500 companies have no female directors at all.77 The same story,

though more dramatic, exists for visible minorities: 16% of Canada's
population self-identify as visible minorities 78
7 9while they account for
only 1.7% of Canadian corporate directors.

Gender and ethnic diversity at the board level and senior
management levels is an area that has not been legislated in Canada
nor does the fiduciary duty impose any such obligation; 80 however, a
bill recently before the Canadian Senate would have required gender

parity on boards of most public corporations and Canadian financial
institutions. 1 A number of countries have either current (Norway,82

Finland,8 3 Spain) 84 or proposed (France) 8 5 legislation to this effect;
74. Dr. Ruth Corbin, "Report on Corporate Governance, 1999: Five Years to the
Dey" (1999), online: European Corporate Governance Institute <http://
www.ecgi.org>.
75. Guylaine Saucier et al., "Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture"
(November 2001), online: <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/beyondcompliance.pdf>.
76. Ibid., at p. 15.
77. Laura Jenner, Monica Dyer and Lilly Whitham, "2007 Catalyst Census of
Women Board Directors of the FP500: Voices from the Boardroom" (New York:
Catalyst, 2008), p. 7, online: Catalyst <http://www.catalyst.org>. In Canada,
although women account for just over 50% of the population, they hold only
13% of the director positions of Financial Post 500 companies.
78. "Canada's Ethnocultural Mosaic, 2006 Census: Findings" (Statistics Canada,
2006), online: Statistics Canada <http://wwwl2.statcan.ca>.
79. Spencer Stuart and Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, "The Canadian
Board Index: Board Trends and Practices at Leading Canadian Companies Building and Retaining Director Talent in Challenging Times" (2003), as cited in
Conference Board of Canada, "Business Critical: Maximizing the Talents of
Visible Minorities" (2005) at p. 86.
80. Canadian corporations must comply with human rights legislation, including the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11
s. 15.

81. Canada, Senate, Board of Directors Gender Parity Act, 40th Parliament, 2nd
Sess., S-238; online: Senate of Canada <http://www2.parl.gc.ca>. The bill, S238, died on the order table when Parliament was prorogued in December 2009.
82. Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act, 1997, Del K: 1, ss. 6-1 Ia.,
online: Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion <http://www.regjeringen.no >. (Norwegian corporate law requires public limited liability companies
to comply with varying degrees of gender representation, depending on the size of
the board.)
83. Finnish Corporate Governance Code of October 28, 2008, online: Securities
Market Association <http://www.cgfinland.fi>. As of January 1, 2010, Finland
requires listed companies to have at least one woman on the board.
84. Spanish Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 March for Effective Equality between
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other countries (Switzerland)8 6 have debated and rejected such

legislation.
While legislating diversity at the board and senior management
levels is one approach, another approach is to contemplate diversity

through a regulatory disclosure regime. The SEC has recently adopted
a new set of rules governing disclosure, one of which would require
diversity as
nominating committees to disclose whether they consider
87

a factor in evaluating potential board nominees.

Many public corporations recognize the importance of diversity,
and are voluntarily embracing such principles. A few corporations

stand out as actively promoting diversity: one Canadian bank reports
that diversity is essential to their success as an organization; it
strengthens their relationships with their customers, clients,
employees, shareholders and other stakeholders, as well as

attracting and retaining top talent.8 8 Another Canadian bank has
included diversity as one of its corporate values, and articulates8 9a

focus on increasing women and minorities in senior management.

Some corporations are adopting the concept of a more diverse

board as a result of shareholder proposals and pressure from

NGOS

and advocacy groups. There is evidence to suggest that shareholder
proposals, even when not initially accepted, may in the future become

part of corporate policy. 90 In the U.S., studies have shown that in
recent years, boards have become more willing to implement
shareholder proposals. 9 1 Recently, only a few shareholder

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Women and Men, 2007, Article 75, online: Council of Europe <http://
www.coe.int>. Spanish legislation recommends, but does not require, a
"sufficient number" of women on the boards of their reporting issuers.
France, Assembl~e nationale, bill no. 2140, "Equal representation of women and
men on boards of directors", online: assembl~e nationale <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>. A bill was introduced on December 3, 2009, which would
require 20% representation of women on corporate boards within 18 months,
and full gender parity within five years.
Curia Vista - Objets parlementaires, The Federal Assembly, The Swiss
Parliament June 20, 2003, online: Swiss Parliament <http://www.parlament.ch>. Switzerland considered legislating 30% representation of women on
corporate boards of companies over which the Swiss government has some
control. Ultimately, it was decided that board composition is a decision best left
to the corporation.
U.S., Securities and Exchange Commission, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements
(2009), at p. 38-39, online: sEc <http://www.sec.gov>.
"How is TD Embracing and Building Diversity", online: Toronto Dominion Bank
< http://www.td.com >. On TD Bank's board of 17 members, four are women.
"Vision & Priorities for Diversity", online: Royal Bank of Canada <http://
www.rbc.com>. (On Rac's board of 15 members, two are women.)
Dhir, supra, footnote 68, at p. 49.
Fabrizio Ferri, Yonca Ertimur and Stephen Stubben, "Board of Directors'
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals" (paper

444

Canadian Business Law Journal

[Vol. 48

proposals advocating diversity on boards9 2 have been adopted in
Canada. Lundin Mining Corporation agreed to include diversity as
part of its board selection criteria, ahead of its 2008 Annual General
Meeting (AGM) which was to see a shareholder proposal calling for
this. However, the following is a list of 2009 AGMS where shareholder
proposals calling for 50% female representation on the board failed:
Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, BCE, Bombardier, Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce (cIBc), Laurentian Bank, Manulife
Financial, Power Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank, and TD
Bank. 9 3 The most support for these shareholder proposals - at
9.44% - came from Power Corporation shareholders.9 4 National

Bank, when faced with the same proposal, agreed in advance of its
February 2009 AGM to continue its efforts to recruit more women
of half of all board candidates
candidates for9the
5 board, with the goal
being women.
This section has canvassed a number of different approaches to
promoting diversity, from legislation, to voluntary adoption of
guidelines and targets. While we may or may not see specific
legislation on gender parity in Canada in the near future, gender or
racial parity in Canada is not currently required under any specific
law or the general fiduciary duty. Nonetheless, some organizations
are voluntarily taking the initiative to make their boards more
representative, as they see this introduction of diverse perspectives as
being in the best interests of the corporation, and/or they see it as an
effective response to stakeholder groups advancing this position.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that an effective corporate governance
regime involves a spectrum of mechanisms that range from purely
legal or hard law to purely voluntary or market-based initiatives.
Society's acceptance of where we lie on the spectrum changes over
presented to the AAA 2007 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting; 3rd
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, December 2007), online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com>; James F. Cotter and Randall S. Thomas, "Shareholder
Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and
Market Reaction", J. Corp. Fin., [forthcoming], online: SSRN <http://
ssrn.com >.

92. It should be noted that diversity in this context is almost always couched in terms
of gender diversity, and does not typically address ethnic diversity.
93. SHARE, supra, footnote 66.
94. Ibid. online: SHARE <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1801>. (MEDAC-ponsored
shareholder proposal to Power Corporation of Canada Annual General Meeting,
May 13, 2009.)
95. Ibid. online: SHARE <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1796>.
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time and is connected to the economic and political events of the
day. 96 The global financial crisis of 2008/2009 has been attributed, at
least in part, to a failure of corporate governance, seen as a failure of
and
institutional investors to "act as owners" in holding management
97
the board of directors accountable for their decisions.
While the board of directors is considered an important organ of
corporate governance, Canadian jurisprudence - with the most
recent pronouncement in BCE - has developed in such a way that
directors have wide discretion in making decisions. I have argued in
this paper that greater consideration of a broader range of
stakeholder interests in business decision-making is necessarily
dependent on a range of factors beyond legal rules. In my view,
corporate culture matters, as does who the corporate directors and
corporate managers are. The composition of the shareholder base
and the power and support from other stakeholders also have
tremendous impact on the advancement of stakeholder interests in
business organizations. This paper has not attempted to suggest that
there is no role for law, but rather to point out its limitations, and at
the same time highlight the power of non-legal mechanisms voluntary initiatives - in corporate governance, and the interplay
between the two.

96. Poonam Puri and Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "Proportionate Liability under the CBCA
[Canada Business Corporations Act] in the Context of Recent Corporate
Governance Reform: Canadian Auditors in the Wrong Place at the Wrong
97.

Time?" (2003), 39 C.B.L.J. 36 at pp. 40-45 (WLeC).
Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson, "Active Shareowner

Stewardship: A New Paradigm for Capitalism" (2009), 2 R.I.J.P.M. 10 at p. 11;
online: SSRN <http://papers.ssrn.com>.

